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INTRODUCTION 
For the 2019–20 National Basketball Association season, the 
Golden State Warriors are set to leave their current home of Oracle Arena 
in Oakland to move across the bay to the brand-new Chase Center in San 
Francisco.1 True to the ethos of their Silicon Valley backgrounds, the 
Warriors’ ownership implemented an innovative financing mechanism to 
assist their move. The Warriors organization references this financing 
scheme as a “‘membership’ program.”2 This program is synonymous with 
what previous sports franchises referred to as a “Personal Seat License” 
(“PSL”) agreement.3 In essence, the Warriors solicited their rabid and 
                                                     
*J.D. The University of Illinois College of Law 2020 
1 Jim Harrington, Golden State Warriors unveil stunning new arena in 
San Francisco, THE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.mercurynew
s.com/2019/08/26/golden-state-warriors-unveil-new-amazing-new-arena-in-san-
francisco-photos/. 
2 Al Saracevic, Warriors Reveal Long-Term Chase Center Season-Ticket 
Plan, S.F. CHRON. (July 19, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sports/article/
Warriors-new-offer-Season-tickets-for-30-years-11300137.php. 
3 Martin J. Greenberg & M’Kenzee Galloway, Personal Seat Licenses in the 
NBA: Golden State Warriors, GREENBERG L. OFFICES (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.greenberglawoffice.com/personal-seat-licenses/#_ftn83. 
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wealthy fanbase to help with the costs of constructing this new arena. Of 
note, Bruce Schoenfeld of the New York Times speculates that this decision 
was not made on a whim but rather has been in the works for quite some 
time as he claims:4  “Once Warriors’ owners Joe Lacob and Peter Guber 
decided their team needed a new arena, in San Francisco – and they 
seemingly made that decision before they bought the team in 2010 – they 
also knew who would pay for it: the fans.”5  
Within the new Chase Center, 12,000 of the available 18,064 seats 
for Warriors’ home games will be set aside for purchasers of the Warriors’ 
PSL membership.6 For most seats the membership fee for the Warriors’ 
PSL reported to be $15,000.7 Although, for some select seats this fee 
reported as being as high as $35,000.8 Moreover, this fee for the 
membership is for the right to purchase a season ticket and is not 
incorporated in the “actual cost of the season ticket.”9 The price of the 
actual tickets reported to be $600 per seat, which amounts to $26,400 for 
the season.10 The Warriors’ PSL offering is further unlike previously 
implemented PSLs, differing in a few key respects. The general nature of 
the Warriors’ PSLs offering is that it requires “season-ticket buyers to pay 
a one-time fee that will enable you to buy your seats for 30 years.”11  
                                                     
4 Bruce Schoenfeld, What Happened When Venture Capitalists Took 
Over the Golden State Warriors, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/magazine/what-happened-when-venture-
capitalists-took-over-the-golden-state-warriors.html?searchResultPosition=1. 
5 Id. 
6 Ron Leuty, How the Warriors Shift the Ticket Lineup to Deliver 
‘the Right Value’, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Jun. 22, 2018), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/06/22/golden-state-
warriors-season-tickets-chase-oracle.html. 
7 Id. 
8 Scott Ostler, Warriors’ New Arena Gives Some Season-Ticket Holders 
Sticker shock, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sports/
ostler/article/Warriors-new-arena-gives-some-season-12720962.php?psid=ixvj. 
9 Patrick Murray, Just How Lucrative Will the Chase Center Be For The 
Warriors, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmurray/
2018/09/09/just-how-lucrative-will-the-chase-center-be-for-the-
warriors/#53b634102b29. 
10 See Ostler, supra note 8. 
11 Scott Polacek, Warriors’ Season Tickets to Require Fans to Buy 30-
Year Membership at New Arena, BLEACHER REP. (July 19, 2017), 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2722678-warriors-season-tickets-to-require-
fans-to-buy-30-year-membership-at-new-arena. 
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The first of these differences in the Warriors’ PSL from previous 
PSL arrangements is a “refund.” “In a unique twist yet to be used in any 
pro sport, the Warriors promise to pay back that fee after 30 years.”12 
Arguably, though, this refund does more for the Warriors from a public 
relations standpoint than function as offering its fans a true refund.13 For 
after being “[a]djusted for inflation, that money won’t be worth much 
down the road.”14 A dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.15 
A dollar today is worth much more than a dollar in thirty years.16  
This article will focus on how this second key difference 
implemented in the Warriors’ PSL would affect an eventual bankruptcy 
proceeding of a purchaser into their “membership program.” In the event 
of a purchaser filing for bankruptcy liquidation under chapter seven of the 
bankruptcy code, the PSL will join the rest of the bankrupt’s assets in 
becoming property of the now-bankrupt purchaser’s creditors estate. 
Purchasers into the Warriors’ offering can be either individuals or 
corporations. This article will provide an analysis of how the debtor, estate, 
and team will likely fare in terms of recouping the value of the PSL as an 
asset in the event of a purchaser’s liquidation in bankruptcy. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Rise of the National Basketball Association 
Following the turn of the millennium in the year 2000, the 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) and its franchises saw a 
tremendous ascension in terms of their financial value. The most recent 
NBA franchise sold were the Houston Rockets, in 2017, selling for what 
currently holds as a record $2.2 billion.17 In context, the Miami Heat sold 
                                                     
12 See Saracevic, supra note 2. 
13 Id. 
14 Rick Welts, Golden State Warriors Season Tickets Will Require a 30 
Year PSL Agreement at Chase Center, FROMTHISSEAT.COM, http://www.fromth
isseat.com/index.php/blog/19863-golden-state-warriors-season-tickets-will-
require-a-30-year-psl- agreement-at-chase-center (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
15 Nick Lioudis, Time Value of Money and the Dollar, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032715/why-does-time-value-
money-tvm-assume-dollar-today-worth-more-dollar-tomorrow.asp (last updated 
Apr. 18, 2018).   
16 Id. 
17 Tim Cato, How much did each NBA owner pay to buy their teams?, 
SB NATION (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/nba/2017/9/5/16255168
/nba-teams-sold-highest-record-price-all-30. 
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for only $68 million in 1995.18 This ascension enjoyed throughout the 
league has commonly been attributed to a few factors. First, the 
introduction of streaming services such as Netflix, Hulu, and, Amazon 
Prime among others placed a heavy premium on cable providers’ ability 
to broadcast “event” television.19 Watching an NBA basketball game live 
became considered as within the bucket of “event” television.20 For, it is 
an utterly different experience to watch a television show such as 
“Scandal” or “NCIS” subsequent to the original broadcast than it is to 
watch a replay of a National Basketball game. Broadcasters responded to 
consumers ascribing value in experiencing unscripted live events, such as 
sports games, as they happen in real-time.21 
Second, the creation of social media platforms, most notably, 
Twitter, created a community where fans communicate with friends or 
even strangers in the conversation taking place online considering a live 
game they are watching.22 Fans, journalists, and NBA players came to 
commonly refer to this medium as NBA Twitter.23 Where fans “watch 
games together and comment on news, highlights, and roster moves.”24 
This affected not only increased enthusiasm over the actual gameplay but 
also interest in team management and transactions in the offseason. The 
NBA capitalized on social media to a higher degree than any other 
American professional sports league.25 “The NBA is the most-tweeted-
about sports league in 2018, according to Twitter, with more than 100 
million NBA-related tweets heading into the NBA finals.”26 This was no 
accident as other “leagues such as the NFL and Major League Baseball 
have gone after sites and social media users who have posted video 
without permission, the NBA took the opposite approach.”27 Adam Silver, 
                                                     
18 Id. 
19 Meg James, The Rise of sports TV costs and why your cable bill keeps 
going up, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/busines
s/hollywood/la-fi-ct-sports-channels-20161128-story.html.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Rick Maese, NBA Twitter: A sports bar that doesn’t close, where the 
stars pull up a seat next to you, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/05/31/nba-twitter-a-
sports-bar-that-doesnt-close-where-the-stars-pull-up-a-seat-next-to-you/. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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the NBA’s commissioner, contrarily took the position that he “considers 
online videos to be a form of marketing. He likens them to ‘snacks’ that 
might whet fans’ appetites for something bigger.”28 
Additionally, the players of the NBA, likely as a byproduct of 
growing up in the social media world, sought out to build themselves as 
being synonymous with a recognizable and positive brand.29 Omar Raja, 
founder of the House Highlights Instagram account, commented that 
“what separates the NBA from the other leagues is the personalities, 
accessibility, and relatability. Even if NBA players have wildly different 
incomes and lifestyles than their fans, they live in the same online 
community.”30 Players such as LeBron James and Stephen Curry 
transcended basketball to become some of the biggest household celebrity 
names in the world. These stars transcended basketball even to use their 
platform to become a powerful voice in social justice issues. As one 
example, “Miami Heat star Dwyane Wade, who has 8 million followers, 
tweeted about the victims of the Parkland, Fla., school shooting in 
February, a post that received 538,000 likes and 155,000 retweets.”31 
Gone are the days of NBA players bringing firearms into the 
locker rooms.32 It very well may be the case that the public relations staff 
of the NBA simply did their jobs well. In some respect it is of importance 
to the NBA’s rise that it has mostly avoided the issues that recently 
plagued the image of the National Football League (NFL) stemming from 
players consistently engaging in domestic violence, kneeling during the 
national anthem, and the increasing evidence of the long-term effects from 
suffering numerous concussions.33 
B. Recent Success of the Golden State Warriors 
In 1975, the Warriors won their first championship as tenants of 
Oracle Arena.34 In the following thirty years, however, the Warriors and 
                                                     
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Jianna West, Gilbert Arenas Details 2009 Gun Showdown With 
Javaris Crittenton, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.si.com/nba/2018/08/07/gilbert-arenas-card-game-guns-details-
javaris-crittenton-wizards. 
33 PBS NEWS HOUR, Tumultuous year for NFL marked by protests, 
injuries and a ratings drop (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/sho
w/tumultuous-year-for-nfl-marked-by-protests-injuries-and-a-ratings-drop. 
34 Bruce Schoenfeld, What Happened When Venture Capitalists Took 
Over the Golden State Warriors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), 
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their fans saw little success as the franchise mostly fell into irrelevance; 
“This wasn’t just a bad team, but a team that seemed permanently stuck in 
a state of irrelevance.”35 This irrelevance would quickly no longer be the 
case after the Golden State Warriors changed ownership in 2010, when Joe 
Lacob and Peter Guber purchased the Golden State Warriors for a reported 
$450 million.36 Which, at the time, was thought of as a price “wildly 
excessive by nearly everyone.”37 Yet, in the Warriors “Lacob saw a start-
up disguised as an underperforming business, a sports franchise that had 
been run autocratically – and therefore ineptly – as the industry evolved 
around it.”38 
Whether Lacob and Gruber knew at the time is unclear, but they 
soon realized they had been dealt the equivalent of a pair of Aces. Just a 
year prior to their purchase, Warriors in the 2009 NBA draft selected a 
future superstar in Stephen Curry.39 Curry became one of the best and most 
popular players in the history of the league.40 Within the next three years, 
the Warriors would only add to their roster in drafting two more remarkable 
players in Klay Thompson and Draymond Green.41 With these three 
superstars at the helm, in 2015, the Warriors won their first championship 
in exactly thirty years.42 The franchise that was recently considered mostly 
irrelevant was now suddenly one of the preeminent franchises within the 
entire NBA.43 The Warriors mystique soon rose to even greater heights 
when they made the addition of another superstar in Kevin Durant.44 The 
Warriors have since won subsequent titles in 2017 and 2018.45 As of the 
writing of this article, the Warriors are in first place in the Western 
Conference heading into the postseason and appear poised to win another 
                                                     
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/magazine/what-happened-when-venture-
capitalists-took-over-the-golden-state-warriors.html. 
35 Id. 
36 Cato, supra note 17.  
37 Schoenfeld, supra note 34. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Jason Parham, The Warriors and the Myth of the Silicon Valley-Driven 
Team, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/warriors-silicon-
valley/.  
44 Id. 
45 Schoenfeld, supra note 34. 
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title in the 2019 season.46 Today, Forbes estimates  the value of the Golden 
State Warriors franchise at 4.3 billion.47 
Consequently, ticket prices for a seat at a Warriors home game 
skyrocketed since 2014-15. For season ticket holders during the 2014-15 
season, the price range for a single ticket was $18 and $450.48 For the 
2017-18 season, these prices rose to $40 and $715.49 As for the secondary 
market (fans purchasing tickets on the likes of sellers such as stubhub.com 
instead of directly from the team), the average listing price for the 2014-
2015 season was $122.50  Thus far, in the 2018-19 season, the median 
listing price on one of these indexes is $463.51 These prices are based upon 
the Oracle Arena having nearly 20,000 seats.52 The Chase Center will 
provide less supply for the demand by having a total of 18,000 seats.53 
Basic economics suggests that the price of entry for a Warriors’ home 
game at their new arena will only grow. However, this is subject to change. 
The Warriors’ current success in terms of selling season and single-game 
tickets at the moment “doesn’t mean that someone else will want them ten 
years from now.”54 
C. History of PSL Use by Sports Franchises 
The origins of sports franchises employing the financing 
mechanism of the PSL arises from the late 1980’s, when Max Muhleman 
and George Shinn set out to bring an NBA expansion team to Charlotte, 
                                                     
46NBA Standings 2019-20, ESPN (last visited Apr. 7, 2019), 
http://www.espn.com/nba/standings. 
47 The Business of Basketball, FORBES, (last visited Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/nba-valuations/list/#tab:overall. 
48 Darren Rovell, Warriors Raising Ticket Prices Again, ESPN (Feb. 7, 
2017), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/18636756/golden-state-warriors-
raising-ticket-prices-again. 
49 Id. 
50 Prices For Warriors Tickets On Secondary Market Remain Steady 
Following Back-to-Back Championships, TICKETIQ BLOG (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://blog.ticketiq.com/blog/2018-19-golden-state-warriors-tickets-prices- 
schedule. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Al Saracevic, Warriors Reveal Long-Term Chase Center Season-
Ticket Plan, S.F. CHRON. (July, 19 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sports/ar
ticle/Warriors-new-offer-Season-tickets-for-30-years-11300137.php. 
54 Golden State Warriors Season Tickets Will Require A 30 Year PSL 
Agreement At Chase Center, FROMTHISSEAT.COM, (last visited Feb. 17, 2020), 
http://www.fromthisseat.com/index.php/blog/19863-golden-state-warriors-
season-tickets-will-require-a-30-year-psl- agreement-at-chase-center. 
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North Carolina.55 The original idea of Muhleman and Shinn was that 
“future fans would put down a non-refundable deposit of about 10% of 
what the cost of the season tickets would be to get on a season ticket 
waiting list.”56 Charlotte eventually brought an NBA expansion franchise 
partially due to the help of this unique financing scheme.57 Muhleman then 
decided to give those fans “ownership of their seat as a gift to make them 
feel more part of the team, and he called these gifts Charter Seat Rights.”58 
Importantly, “fans were also allowed to assign their rights to anyone if 
they chose not to renew their season tickets.”59 Of note, “Muhleman 
never himself considered that Charter Seat Rights could be used as a 
financing tool, or that fans could sell them for a profit, until he saw an ad 
in a local newspaper.”60 
From this initial success in implementing a PSL financing scheme 
by a sports franchise, Muhleman would use a similar scheme four years 
later when he partnered with Jerry Richardson to bring an National 
Football League (“NFL”) franchise to Charlotte.61 Since then, numerous 
NFL teams followed suit and employed PSL’s in financing not only 
expansion franchises, but also for construction of new stadiums for existing 
franchises.62 Outside of the NFL, though, PSLs have not been in wide use. 
The notable exceptions being the owners of the Toronto franchises using 
them for the NBA Raptors and NHL Maple Leave.63 Some speculated that 
the PSL saw wider use in the NFL because “purchasing season tickets is not 
as big of an obligation. NFL season ticket packages are limited to only 8 
regular season home games each season.”64 As applied to the NBA, “For a 
41 home game basketball season, a personal seat license is a much larger 
obligation which is why the Golden State Warriors are the first team to 
experiment with this system.”65 The success that the Warriors enjoined, 
                                                     
55 Greenberg & Galloway, supra note 3. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Rick Welts, Golden State Warriors Season Tickets Will Require A 30 
Year PSL Agreement At Chase Center, http://www.fromthisseat.com/index.php/b
log/19863-golden-state-warriors-season-tickets-will-require-a-30-year-psl- 
agreement-at-chase-center. 
65 Id. 
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however, will likely result in PSLs becoming more prevalent in the 
financing operations of NBA teams. 
D. Current Demographics of the Bay Area 
One of the consequences of the Warriors’ massive success in the 
2010s has been the many Bay Area residents jumping onto the 
“bandwagon” into newly fashioned Warriors fandom. What it means to be 
a Bay Area resident in terms of demographics—and subsequently for 
many a Warriors “fan”—is much different in the post-2010s than what it 
had been when the Warriors first entered Oracle Arena in 1975.66 Prior to 
the dotcom boom of the early 2000s, the Bay Area was viewed simply as 
the compilation of neighborhoods surrounding San Francisco. Back then, 
San Francisco was just “a small city of around 825,000 poised on the tip 
of a peninsular on America’s western edge that sprang up during the 1840s 
gold rush.67 Within the past two decades, though, the Bay Area underwent 
dramatic change. Millennial entrepreneurs flooded the area as a 
consequence of massive increase in the availability of venture capital 
funding throughout the area.68 Resultingly, “San Francisco has become the 
hype- and capital-fuelled [sic] epicentre [sic] of America’s technology 
industry, which has traditionally centred [sic] on the string of suburban 
cities known as Silicon Valley.”69 To the longstanding inhabitants of San 
Francisco that have been there for generations, this drastic change to the 
demographics of the community has “led to a city that some of its residents 
find unrecognizable.”70 These new “people moving in are more likely to 
have higher levels of formal education, and they tend to be younger, white 
and Asian . . . The result is a city that is younger, more educated, [and] 
richer [by the year.]”71 
Another prevalent feature of the new Bay Area is the amount of 
well-funded startup companies in the area. These startup companies play 
                                                     
66 Michelle Robertson, New Census Data: San Francisco Getting Richer, 
More Crowded, SF GATE (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/expensive-
san-francisco/article/median-income-sf-demographics-rent-price-census- 
13491703.php. 
67 Zoe Corbyn, Is San Francisco Losing Its Soul?, THE GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/is-san-
francisco-losing-its-soul. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Dan Kopf, Quantifying the Changing Face of San Francisco, 
PRICEONOMICS (May 5, 2016), https://priceonomics.com/quantifying-the-
changing-face-of-san-francisco/. 
71 Id. 
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a key role in the purchasing of Warriors’ tickets.72 The abundance of these 
companies combined with the limited nature of available seating for a 
Warriors home game made Warriors tickets the hottest commodity in 
town.73 Many of these startups are “software as a service” (SAAS) 
companies whose business models are reliant upon large scale companies 
contracting for use of their services.74 In turn, these companies have to 
cater to the interests of executives at these corporations in order for them 
to engage with their companies’ offering. For the most part, it is more 
attractive to these executives to receive an offer to attend a Warriors’ game 
than it is to attend that of the San Francisco Giants. The baseball season 
contains many more home games, and the cost of entry is significantly less 
expensive.75 The same is true upon consideration of the San Francisco 
49ers. The 49ers have considerably less mystique than that of the Warriors 
and much higher low-cost ticket availability. The Bay Area also offers 
numerous high-quality restaurant options; making a dinner at one of them 
less interesting. These startups in large part are competing with one 
another. If one of your competitors is offering Warriors’ tickets, your hand 
is essentially forced. The necessity for Bay Area startups in purchasing 
Warriors’ tickets in order to entertain potential clients plays a significant 
role in the desire for these Warriors’ tickets with the opening of the brand-
new Chase Center. 
E. Part 5: Prevalence of American Bankruptcy 
In the absence of the occurrence of an unforeseen event such as 
the recession of the late 2000s, only a minority of membership purchasers 
will eventually enter bankruptcy during the pendency of the agreement. In 
2017, 0.235%, (772,594), of the American population filed for 
bankruptcy.76 However, 0.235% taken year over year for a thirty-year 
period, suddenly becomes a much more prevalent issue. Moreover, in the 
                                                     
72 Schoenfeld, supra note 4. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 New York Giants Tickets, SEATGEEK (last visited Feb. 18 2020), 
https://seatgeek.com/new-york-giants-tickets; see also Golden State Warriors 
Tickets, SEATGEEK (last visited Feb. 18 2020), https://seatgeek.com/golden-state-
warriors-tickets.  
76 June 2017 Bankruptcy Filings Down 2.8 Percent, U.S. COURTS (July 
21, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/07/21/june-2017-bankruptcy-
filings-down-28-percent. 
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post-recession period of 2011, this number was double than what occurred 
in 2017 with 1,417,236 bankruptcies.77 
It is impossible to know how analogous the Warriors’ membership 
purchasers are in terms of likelihood of bankruptcy compared to the 
American public as a whole. Logically, citizens of the Bay Area who can 
afford these tickets seemingly have a significantly larger net worth than 
the typical American and thus a further distance from bankruptcy.78 Yet, 
most of these purchasers are likely part of the “new-money” community 
that made their fortunes off of companies that for now are seen as 
innovative but are not certain to be viewed in the same light in the future. 
These individuals also likely possess a lack of experience in maintaining 
such affluence.79 It may seem on the surface that due to the wealth in the 
Bay Area region that bankruptcy statistics would be lesser than the 
averages within the United States as a whole. However, the validity of this 
assumption seems unclear in light of these unique characteristics that are 
tied to the wealth accumulated in the Bay Area. 
The identity of these purchasers is unknown as they have not been 
made public. Yet, it is safe to assume that in addition to individual 
purchasers that a significant portion of purchasers is the technology-based 
startup companies themselves. The volatility in solvency becomes further 
magnified when considering the companies themselves. 25,227 businesses 
went bankrupt in America in 2017.80 A corporation signing onto a thirty-
year agreement assumes that in thirty years that corporation will still be in 
existence. By nature, this is a gamble. Some of these member corporations 
will go bankrupt and have an effect on the Warriors’ plans. Factors such 
as the possibility of another company producing a product that leaves theirs 
obsolete or failing to live up to ideological promises are a common 
occurrence in the Silicon Valley. The recent outing of the fraud behind one 
of the most discussed Silicon Valley companies in Theranos perhaps is the 
                                                     
77 Just the Facts: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 2006 -2017, U.S. 
COURTS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/03/07/just-facts-
consumer-bankruptcy-filings-2006-2017. 
78 Leanna Garfield, Striking maps reveal the huge wealth gap between 
San Francisco and the rest of the country, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/weath-maps-cities-san-francisco-bay-area-
2018-3. 
79 Alejandra Reyes-Velarde, Here’s why San Francisco isn’t the best 
place to work for a startup, BIZJOURNALS (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/08/09/sf-cost-of-living-
dissuades-startup-owners.html.  
80 June 2017 Bankruptcy Filings Down 2.8 Percent, supra note 76.  
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best example of this latter scenario.81 Resultingly from the Theranos 
scandal having such public significance, the “fake it until you make it” 
mentality of Silicon Valley startups is subject to more scrutiny now than 
ever before. 
II. PRECEDENT  
In 1924, Chief Justice Taft delivered a landmark Supreme Court 
bankruptcy decision in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson.82 The 
facts of the case were that one of the members of the Chicago Board of 
Trade and the corporation—he was President of both—filed for 
bankruptcy.83 Under the rules of the Board, a member was subject to the 
same obligations and discipline as was their corporation.84 The rules of the 
Board membership provided that for the purpose of securing payment on 
obligations, any member of the Board could “prevent the transfer of the 
membership of the debtor member by filing objection to such transfer with 
the Directors.”85 The bankrupt’s now defunct company was “indebted to 
thirty or more members of the Exchange on its contracts in an aggregate 
amount of more than $60,000.”86 Due to the bankrupt’s failure to make 
good on his company’s defaulted contracts, other board members that were 
creditors of the company filed an objection to the transfer.87 These member 
creditors ultimately petitioned to the Supreme Court that the bankruptcy 
trustee’s ability to sell the seat as an asset of the estate was conditioned on 
the prior payment of the $60,000 owed to them.88 As of the bankruptcy 
filing, the free and clear membership seat was valued at $10,500.89 
Upon a filing for bankruptcy, all non-exempt property of the 
bankrupt becomes property of the estate, which consists of the collective 
creditors of the now bankrupt.90 The Court first held that “[t]he 
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membership is property, in a way attached to the person of the bankrupt 
and disposable only by his will. It follows him, therefore, into the 
bankruptcy court . . . ”91 Thus, “[b]y operation of the bankrupt law, the 
membership passes, subject to the rules of the exchange, to the trustee, for 
his disposition of it. The trustee does not become a member, but he does 
come into control of the bankrupt’s right to dispose of the membership . . 
. ”92 The Court ultimately held for these petitioners as it proclaimed that 
the rights the trustee obtained in the seat were of the same nature as was 
held by the bankrupt; “[h]e can transfer or sell it, subject to a right of his 
creditors to prevent his transfer or sale till he settles with them, a right in 
some respects similar to the typical lien of the common law . . . ”93 The 
Court further stated, 
The preference of the member creditors is not created 
after bankruptcy. The lien, if it can be called such, is 
inherent in the property in its creation, and can be asserted 
at any time before actual transfer. Indeed, the danger of 
bankruptcy of the member is perhaps the chief reason, and 
a legitimate one, for creating the lien.94 
For the Warrior’s PSL, the importance of this holding is that the 
trustee would gain no superior rights as had the debtor in terms of the 
contract, which now became property of the estate.95 Under this holding, 
a contract for membership to a board of trade and membership to a 
program allowing purchase of season tickets are of the same validity in 
being considered as an asset.96 The contractual conditions that the asset is 
subject to though continue to hold as the right to it passes to the bankruptcy 
trustee.97 
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit in In re Harrell then considered whether 
a now bankrupt’s season ticket agreement that contained the opportunity 
to renew season tickets for the Phoenix Suns in following seasons was a 
property right that passed to the estate as a consequence of the bankruptcy 
filing.98 The Ninth Circuit held that “the opportunity to renew season 
tickets is not a property right under Arizona law.”99 Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
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found the season ticket agreement to be of inconsequential value to the 
estate.100 As such, it once more became the property of the bankrupt.101 
The court found of particular relevance that the Suns made “it clear in 
written notices sent to season ticket holders each year that the ‘opportunity 
[to renew season tickets] is a privilege granted by the SUNS and may be 
withdrawn in the SUNS’ discretion.’”102 It additionally took into account 
that the season ticket agreement stated that “while the SUNS will exercise 
reasonable efforts to maintain renewal privileges, season ticket holders are 
not guaranteed this opportunity.”103 Moreover, the court considered that 
“even if the high probability of renewal of season tickets does add to the 
salable value of a season ticket account, ‘the addition would represent a 
speculation on chance, not a legal right.’”104 
In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of Trade of City of 
Chicago v. Johnson, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 1996 in In Re Harrell 
seems to have been made in error. Here, the Ninth Circuit committed two 
distinct flaws in error. First, it seemingly ignored the holding of Board of 
Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson as well as another Supreme Court 
holding in the case of Butner v. United States.105 In these cases, the 
Supreme Court defined the interrelationship between federal bankruptcy 
law and state law.106 The Supreme Court established that what comprises 
the property of the estate is first decided by federal bankruptcy law.107 
Eleven U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code further codifies this 
notion as it provides that on the instance of a bankruptcy filing that a 
creditors’ estate is automatically created.108 This estate is comprised of “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”109 State law then, as a subsequent matter, 
addresses the concern of defining the attributes of the property interest in 
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question.110 The Supreme Court recognized this procedure in Butner v. 
United States where it stated that the second step is defining the “property 
interests . . . created and defined by state law.”111 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit also erred in its analysis of the state law attributes the season ticket 
agreement entailed. Despite all of these considerations, the Ninth Circuit 
has not indicated that it believes In Re Harrell to be of non-binding 
precedent. 
In regard to the first error made by the Ninth Circuit, a season 
ticket plan is essentially a membership. By purchasing a season ticket plan 
offered by a team, a buyer in effect becomes a member of the team’s 
season ticket program. In Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson, 
the Supreme Court stated that a “membership is property.”112 Thus, in In 
Re Harrell, the season tickets should have automatically passed to the 
trustee upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy.113 At that moment, the 
trustee, on behalf of the estate, should have become the rightful owner of 
the season ticket agreement. The trustee resultingly should have gained the 
opportunity to decide whether it had value as an asset of the estate. The 
Suns, or alternatively the debtor, should have then been obligated to file a 
motion to the court if he or she desired the tickets be deemed of 
inconsequential value. Importantly, either of these parties (and importantly 
not the trustee) would hold the burden of proving that the agreement was 
of inconsequential value to the estate.114 
As to the latter error, because contract interpretation is a matter of 
state law and the Phoenix Suns are located in Arizona, the Ninth Circuit 
correctly applied Arizona law.115 Yet, the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the 
underlying nature of season ticket agreements with sports teams. The 
Ninth Circuit mistakenly relied on the holding of a distinguishable Arizona 
Court of Appeals case, where the contracting conditions fastened to the 
agreement were entirely distinguishable from what was under 
consideration in In Re Harrell.116 In that case, the court did not recognize 
the expectation of a lease renewal as an asset because “the underlying land 
[had been] taken [by condemnation] by the state.”117 As a reminder, the 
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pertinent issue is whether a trustee can recoup value from selling the asset. 
The Ninth Circuit failed to realize that there is a clear distinction between 
a season ticket agreement with a sports team and a lease for land that has 
already been condemned by the state. The Ninth Circuit should not have 
found these two circumstances synonymous. Furthermore, all of the 
additional cases cited by the Ninth Circuit focus on landlord-tenant 
relationships, in which the landlords have revocable powers.118 The legal 
rights and duties ascribed to landlord-tenant relationships are entirely 
different from season ticket purchasers and sports team relationships. 
The trustee would likely see value in the agreement for the right 
to specific seats during a Phoenix Suns home game. This is a different 
scenario than the potential value to be gained from condemned land. The 
ultimate buyer of the ticket, however, would have to be made aware of the 
risk that the Suns might not renew. But, it is likely that the market would 
provide such a buyer with other options that would make it worth the risk 
that the Suns might, for some reason, not honor the renewal. The court 
found that the trustee was never able to find such a buyer.119 It is unclear 
if the Suns maintained any sort of waitlist for these tickets. Yet, in the 
current case of the Warriors, it is public information that there is currently 
a 43,000 person-long waitlist for the Warriors’ membership.120 Thus, there 
certainly would be value in having priority consideration over the rest of 
the waitlist. 
Lastly, it should be noted that despite the factual similarities arising 
from the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Reiser v. Dayton Country Club (In Re 
Magness), the case would not apply as persuasive authority here.121 The 
Sixth Circuit in In Re Magness considered whether a trustee could sell a 
golf club membership that was conditioned on a non-assignability 
clause.122 If the condition could have been removed, the asset would have 
had considerable value to the estate due to the club’s long waitlist.123 The 
analysis in the case, though, was based on the court’s classification of the 
agreement as an executory contract.124 The court found that “the contracts 
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creating the complex relationships among the parties and others are not in 
any way commercial. They create personal relationships among 
individuals who play golf, who are waiting to play golf, who eat together, 
swim and play together. They are personal contracts.”125 The Sixth Circuit, 
thus, essentially categorized the contracts as personal service agreements 
that the club renews to its members who paid their fee.126 Consequently, 
the agreement was classified as an executory contract because both parties 
still had ongoing material obligations.127 
The Warriors’ only ongoing obligation in their PSL agreement is to 
pay a refund thirty years in the future.128 The team does not provide a 
service beyond allowing a person the ability to purchase season tickets.129 
The PSL itself does not commit the Warriors to any further obligation.130 
The purchaser, in addition, still has to affirmatively buy season tickets that 
would be subject to a separate agreement.131 Even if the actual season ticket 
agreement was included in the initial PSL, a court would be unlikely to 
classify allowing entry to a sporting event as an ongoing obligation that is 
akin to a personal service agreement. Moreover, the purchaser is not 
obligated to purchase the tickets every year, but is simply given the 
opportunity to do so if they so choose.132 Based on these facts, it is unlikely 
that a court would classify the Warriors PSL as an ongoing executory 
contract. 
III. ANALYSIS 
As a California-based sports franchise, the Golden State Warriors 
fall within the scope of the Ninth Circuit. Yet, even if the Ninth Circuit were 
to maintain that its holding in In Re Harrell was sound, in spite of Chicago 
Board of Trade & Butner, the circumstances of the Warriors’ offering is 
distinguishable from those considered in In Re Harrell. Under the 
Warriors’ membership plan, “Members will receive the right to buy a 
specific season ticket location for each year of the membership term. 
Memberships will be available on a per seat basis.”133 In contrast to the 
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facts considered in In Re Harrell, the Warriors’ agreement suggests that the 
right to purchase season tickets for the seasons that would follow a 
bankruptcy filing is guaranteed.134 Furthermore, the fact that the Warriors 
currently have 43,000 people on their waitlist evidences that there would 
be significant and identifiable value stemming from the possibility of 
jumping this line.135 It is a fair assumption that the Golden State Warriors’ 
legal team confirmed that the conditions in their PSL are valid under 
California contract law. Since the right for a PSL purchaser to be given the 
option to purchase Warriors season tickets is guaranteed for every season, 
it is unlikely that a court within the Ninth Circuit would find this property 
interest to have no value under California property law.136 
The Warriors’ PSL offering also does not contain a firm non-
transferability clause that could lead to a court bound by the Ninth Circuit 
to find that the PSL contains no value for the estate.137 Chicago Board of 
Trade once more requires that the trustee gain no additional rights than 
those the debtor possessed under the original agreement.138 If the debtor 
was unable to transfer the seat, neither could the trustee. In this scenario, 
the Warriors would be under no obligation to honor its PSL obligations as 
to the eventual purchaser from the trustee’s sale. The PSL is thus worthless 
if it becomes owned by anyone but the initial purchaser. The trustee would 
have no other option than to find this type of PSL to be of inconsequential 
value to the estate. As a result, the PSL once again returns to the possession 
of the now bankrupt debtor. This scenario places the Warriors in a non-
ideal position. Seemingly, each subsequent year, the Warriors would be 
at the mercy of having to wait and see whether the bankrupt debtor can 
find the solvency to pay for the next season before being able to find a 
replacement customer to recoup value. Importantly, the purchaser who is 
now bankrupt already fulfilled their obligations under the PSL by paying 
the initial fee. Accordingly, the bankruptcy purchase faces no risk of 
absolving the agreement by default. 
On the other hand, if the Warriors had no conditions on their 
transferability clause, then the trustee could seemingly sell the 
“membership” to any individual who offered the most value for the benefit 
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of the estate. This arguably harms the Warriors in three main ways. First, 
this does a disservice to their long waitlist, which results in a wave of 
negative publicity. Second, the estate—not the Warriors—would be in the 
position to recoup all of the available proceeds that could be acquired on 
the market for the membership sale. Lastly, arena security came into more 
focus than ever before as a result of a series of unfortunate recent incidents. 
Of particular note is the recent suicide bombing that occurred at an Ariana 
Grande concert at the Manchester Arena in 2017, which resulted in the 
deaths of twenty-two concert goers.139 To ensure the safety of all game 
attendees, it is in the best interest of the Warriors to know and control who 
can enter their arena. This concern is further heightened when certain 
individuals are in attendance for every Warriors home game. Currently, the 
prevalence of secondary market sales for single game tickets on sites such 
as Stubhub140 or SeatGeek141 made knowing everyone who is in the 
building for a game difficult. However, being able to do so is an 
aspirational goal for sports teams in the future and must be considered in 
light of the Warriors’ PSL containing a thirty-year lifespan. 
The Warriors avoided these issues by instead including the 
provision that they “will control all transfers, or sales of memberships, on 
their own marketplace” in their PSL agreements.142 Following Supreme 
Court precedent143 and the bankruptcy code,144 this provision will continue 
to attach to the Warriors’ “membership” in the case it were to become an 
asset of a bankruptcy estate. The importance of this is that it avoids all of 
the undesirable issues outlined above as the effect of this provision is that 
the PSL provides some value as to not be found inconsequential to the 
estate. Thus, the PSL would not remain subject to the now bankrupt 
individual. The PSL further provides that, in addition to the sale having to 
place on the marketplace controlled by the Warriors, “Members will have 
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the opportunity to sell their membership to a third party, for an amount not 
to exceed their initial investment.”145  
Importantly, though, there is no limitation to what price the 
Warriors could receive from this sale. The market dictates this. A waitlist 
of 43,000 suggests that the current price would largely exceed the initial. 
By contract, all value above the initial price is for the sole enjoyment of 
the Warriors organization. They ensured that as each individual or 
corporation, startup or otherwise, enters into bankruptcy liquidation their 
membership no longer applies to an insolvent, will be sold to a person of 
their choice and at a value that they receive the greatest benefit. The 
occurrence of the number of purchaser bankruptcy filings will not be 
insignificant over a thirty-year lifespan. 
The Warriors, in effect, presented an opportunity for subsequent 
NBA teams to now deploy their own future PSL offerings. However, the 
amount of leverage each team may have in contracting favorable terms 
differs based on the surrounding circumstances. As addressed in the 
background portion of this paper, the Warriors enjoy a number of favorable 
factors that place them in a position of significant leverage in the 
contracting process. The Warriors were in a position that allowed them to 
contract for complete control over the sale or transfer of one of these 
memberships from the outset of the agreement. Once more, the waitlist 
contains 43,000 potential purchasers. For the Warriors, these provisions 
are not triggered on the occurrence of any event.  They come into effect as 
soon as the PSL is enforceable onto the parties. 
Future small-market teams implementing a PSL likely will be 
unable to enjoy the advantages the Bay Area provides.  There are not many 
locations that contain such wealth and scale of well-financed corporations 
nearby. These teams likely would find themselves unsuccessful in 
implementing such strenuous provisions onto their purchasers. It may also 
be of importance as to what the PSL is funding. For example, there may be 
significant excitement in the community that results in increased demand 
for an expansion team that proposes to enter a smaller market for the first 
time, as evidenced by the events in Charlotte.146 The effect of this may be 
that the organization has comparable leverage to the Warriors in order 
implement similar terms in a licensing agreement that guarantees a seat 
for a number of years. In most instances that a PSL will be implemented 
though organizations will consider an already existing team in a market 
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proposing a PSL for the purpose of helping fund construction of a new 
arena. In a small market, the leverage equation would likely shift in the 
opposite direction. 
The Warriors left their previous home of the less affluent Oakland 
to move across the bay in large part because the demographics of their 
new location in San Francisco allowed them to price their PSL to a level at 
which they could rely on private financing.147 Resultingly, they were for 
the most part able to avoid the outcry that often occurs when a team only 
pays a small portion for the construction of a new stadium while leaving 
taxpayers to foot the majority of the bill. The Warriors’ ability to charge 
such a high price in their PSL is in addition to these subsequent conditions 
they included in the agreement that are the subject of this article.148 
This additional context speaks to the magnitude of the leverage that the 
Warriors enjoy. 
To almost every other NBA team, the idea of making fans pay a 
substantial fee for the right to be able to buy tickets is substantially outside 
the scope of reason. Their PSL offerings almost assuredly need to account 
for the actual tickets before the subsequent conditions of the agreement are 
even considered. For many NBA cities, the different options such as season 
tickets to the cities other sports teams are comparable in terms of value to 
what the NBA team offers. Unlike the Warriors, such a need for these 
tickets for some individuals and corporations simply does not exist in other 
cities. Most purchasers, especially corporations, will also likely retain an 
attorney to go over the agreement before paying what would be a large 
sum to them. Some level of negotiation and red-lining will likely take 
place between these potential purchasers and the team. The Warriors 
seemingly did not have to face this. The likelihood of the NBA team being 
able to hold onto these provisions is not very high. However, these teams 
should take note from the Warriors and implement these provisions with a 
trigger that bears no consequence onto the purchaser but would for the 
team. 
In sum, a classification can be made as to three levels for leverage 
future sports teams have for what terms and conditions they place on a 
successful PSL offering. The first and highest level is for teams that enjoy 
conditions similar to the Warriors. The next level is for teams that enjoy 
similar leverage to the Warriors due to the specific circumstances 
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surrounding the PSL offering. The most likely scenario here would be an 
expansion team entering a new market. The third and most prevalent level 
concerns teams that are in a position of having considerably less leverage 
than the Warriors had for their PSL offering. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE NBA FRANCHISES 
IMPLEMENTING A PSL FINANCING 
The lesson is clear for teams that find themselves in the position 
of being in the first or second level in terms of the leverage they have for 
their PSL offering. These teams should mirror their offerings by the closest 
proximity possible to those of the provisions discussed in this article 
implemented in the Warriors offering. The best possible scenario for all 
teams is for these provisions to be given full effect from the outset of their 
relationship with the PSL purchaser coming into existence. For the 
majority of teams, however, the trigger that should be added onto these 
provisions in future PSLs is as follows. Importantly, the result for these 
teams would be avoiding the undesirable circumstance of the Phoenix 
Suns arising from In re Harrel.149 
As to what this specific trigger could be, § 541(c) of the bankruptcy 
code bears large significance.150 This provision of the bankruptcy code 
makes any contractual provision unenforceable upon a bankruptcy filing 
that is: 
[C]onditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of 
the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this 
title, or on the appointment of or taking possession by a 
trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such 
commencement, and that affects or gives an option to 
effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the 
debtor’s interest in property.151 
 
The added trigger thus must fall outside of the scope of conditions 
541(c) and deemed as ineffective upon a bankruptcy filing and result in 
being stripped as applying to the from PSL. At the same time, however, the 
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trigger should also take into account how purchasers and their attorneys 
would react when presented with a sales pitch. 
Upon consideration of all the various aspects, future teams in 
this latter category should implement the following trigger onto the new 
provisions introduced in the Warriors PSL: “purchaser’s creditors have 
gained legal entitlement by a judicial proceeding to sell the seat license 
subject to this agreement.” 
 
As to the 541(c) issue, this provision is outside of its scope 
because it is a trigger that occurs often outside of bankruptcy and 
insolvency. Notably, it would trigger in the event of a non-bankruptcy 
foreclosure sale over the PSL. Secured transactions undergo such sales in 
significant frequency and often do not concern an insolvent party. In fact, 
it would occur probably more often here than it would in bankruptcy. 
Thus, 541(c) should not be of issue. 
Also, purchasers should have no issue with this trigger as the 
occurrence of said trigger taking place—the purchaser likely already lost 
their rights to the PSL anyway. The purchaser who defaulted with the PSL 
as collateral likely would be unable to redeem and prevent a foreclosure 
sale. Season tickets to a sports team are also likely not of much concern in 
the face of bankruptcy for the filer. Thus, teams should not face any 
roadblocks in implementing this suggestion in their future PSL offerings. 
It is always best to be safe than sorry as evidenced by the crippling 
recession of the late 2000s. Teams should take advantage of the growing 
interest in the NBA in their financing schemes to the level they can. 
Including this provision in a future PSL can only serve as a benefit to a 
team. Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity; higher courts are often not as 
experienced in bankruptcy law and may be subject to manipulation by the 
parties. NBA teams should protect themselves by specifically contracting 
for these outcomes in the event of a future purchaser’s bankruptcy 
liquidation. 
In conclusion, future NBA teams should follow the Warriors’ lead 
and implement marketplace and sales restrictions to the extent their 
leverage over purchasers allows in future PSL offerings. At the very least, 
every team should implement these provisions with the proposed trigger 
above to address concerns arising from a future purchaser’s filing for 
bankruptcy liquidation. 
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